US presidential elections have historically had limited impact on Africa, marked by a bipartisan political consensus in Washington. However, in the face of recent global upheavals and growing polarization in the United States, Africa is now viewing Washington in a new light. As Africans diversify their partnerships, the outcome of the upcoming elections could change the dynamics of relations between the two continents. Presidential elections in the United States have implications for all regions of the world. Historically, however, they have been less significant in Africa, where a bipartisan political consensus has largely prevailed in Washington. Washington’s basic approach to the continent has not varied much from one administration to the next. In fact, since the Clinton administration, the American approach to Africa has followed a similar formula involving high-profile development programs, ambitious rhetoric on democracy and human rights, and ever-expanding security partnerships that have kept ties wi
th the continent on a steady trajectory, but not much more.
Yet amid a succession of global and American shocks, from the Covid-19 pandemic to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, to the George Floyd protests and the January 6 uprising, Africa now sees the United States with radically different eyes. At the same time, deep and growing political polarization in the United States is undermining even traditional areas of bipartisan agreement, such as Africa policy. As a result, the conduct and outcome of the November elections will undoubtedly shape how Washington is perceived and may well influence a host of policy issues that not only matter materially to Africa but will also affect U.S. credibility on the continent for years to come.
Amid a succession of global and American shocks, from the Covid-19 pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to the George Floyd protests and the January 6 insurrection, Africa today sees the United States with radically different eyes.
Africa’s expectations
Africans are now much mo
re optimistic about the impact a new U.S. administration could have on them. Since Barack Obama’s election, Africans have never believed that the White House candidate would have a significant impact on their well-being. However, the idea that an African-American president could fundamentally elevate the continent’s importance in Washington was quickly dispelled by an Obama administration that has not strayed from traditional orthodoxy toward Africa: boasting about democracy and human rights while pursuing national security interests that are often at odds with its stated values. The U.S. overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, whose pernicious effects are still felt on the continent today, remains a contemporary reminder of the disconnect between the promotion of American values ??and Washington’s aggressive pursuit of core interests in Africa.
Despite the Biden administration’s promises to bring Africans’ collective voices to global decision-making and institutions, the White House has yet to d
eliver. Africans still hold no seats on the UN Security Council two years after Biden agreed to do so, while the US response to climate change, development finance, and great power competition all appear to continue to favor the Global North. These overpromises and underdeliveries have only reinforced the long-standing reputation that Washington is an inherently unreliable, even hypocritical, partner. Neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris, who ignored Africa during their campaigns, have done anything to give Africans the impression that their administrations will be significantly different from previous ones.
Despite the Biden administration’s promises to elevate the collective voice of Africans in global decision-making and institutions, the White House continues to fail to deliver on its rhetoric.
Against this backdrop, Africans have actively diversified their political, economic, and security partnerships away from Washington over the past decade, sometimes at odds with U.S. interests. China is now Afri
ca’s largest trade and investment partner, and countries like Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are increasingly becoming security partners of choice for African countries seeking unconditional military assistance. This hedge against U.S. unreliability not only makes the outcome of a presidential election less important to the continent, it also makes it harder for any new administration to deepen ties with Africa.??
Form before function
The prospect of deep policy differences between a Trump and Harris administration suggests that each side has strong views about what US relations or policies towards Africa should be. But that is simply not the case. From a macro perspective, Africa should expect a great deal of continuity in Washington’s underlying policy approach, with some key initiatives in development and humanitarian aid, but nothing that fundamentally challenges the current US modus operandi or how it ranks Africa on its global agenda. Interestingly, the prospect of a second US president
of African descent also does not seem to have appealed to African populations in the way that the Obama campaign did, with most of them now having learned not to expect too much from an American politician.
The prospect of deep policy differences between the Trump and Harris administrations suggests that each side has strong views about what U.S. relations or policies toward Africa should be. But that is simply not the case.
However, a Harris administration would likely stick to Biden’s US strategy for sub-Saharan Africa , released in 2022, which aims to elevate Africa’s voice in global institutions and in US decision-making on policy issues that directly affect the continent. Harris herself saw this firsthand when she visited Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia in March 2023 to ‘highlight and promote the continent’s extraordinary creativity, ingenuity, and dynamism.’ But she also fell into the easy trap of trying to frame Africa’s persistent challenges as somehow China’s fault, while presenting US engagement as en
tirely benevolent by making China’s responsibility for Africa’s debt crisis a key part of her Africa agenda. Neither idea is entirely true, but sticking to these tropes doesn’t really show an approach to the continent that breaks with past narratives about how the United States sees African states or how African states should see them.
Meanwhile, Trump’s shadow policy doctrine, Project 2025 , appears to echo entire elements of Biden’s Africa strategy, arguing, for example, that ‘Africa’s explosive population growth, its vast reserves of industrially dependent minerals, its proximity to major shipping lanes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance.’ This suggests that the Trump team at least recognizes Africa’s long-term strategic importance, just as Biden has. The question is: what will they do about it?
More importantly, the Trump team may have learned to view Africa’s position as an intrinsic strength, not just a minor component of the broader U.S. geopolitical struggl
e with China or Russia, as it did during its first term to the chagrin of many on the continent. The litmus test for a potential second Trump administration will be whether it can continue to articulate Africa’s inherent value to U.S. strategic interests or whether it will revert to the kinds of callous rhetoric that characterized its first term.
In fact, the biggest overall difference may be one of form rather than function. Trump’s unabashedly derogatory tone during his first term still angers Africans, but some now see it, with hindsight, as a harsh but honest assessment of their position in Washington’s hierarchy of priorities. As difficult as this truth is, stating it openly helps to set clear expectations for African leaders about what they can expect from Washington and gives them the responsibility to respond to the needs of their own people, which they are already doing by seeking new security and financial partnerships.
Similarly, as distasteful as it may seem to many in the Washington foreign pol
icy establishment , Trump’s overtly transactional approach to policymaking strikes some African leaders as a more direct and transparent way of doing business-and reflects the way many of them already engage with their partners. Unlike a political relationship where neither side explicitly benefits, which looks more like charity, this approach can feel more like a meeting of equals, which is precisely what many African leaders say they seek in their dealings with the world. China goes so far as to call its own strategic agenda with Africa a ‘partnership of equals.’ It would not be surprising, then, to see Trump’s approach to Africa echo China’s own tactics toward the continent.
Conversely, Washington’s pursuit of its core interests, often thinly disguised under the veil of ‘shared values,’ may ring increasingly hollow on a continent where leaders are becoming acutely aware of what they see as American hypocrisy when our values ??are not universally applied around the world. A new administration will have to
reckon with the fact that the overall tenor of U.S. relations with Africa will be shaped in large part by Washington’s unconditional support for Israel and Africa’s growing sympathy for the Palestinian cause, as well as Washington’s continued support for Ukraine in its war with Russia, the immediate side effects of which continue to hurt Africans in the form of higher commodity prices.
Decline of Bipartisanship and Global Policy Divergences
The expected changes in policy toward Africa will likely be defined more by their implementation than by their underlying intent. Indeed, many of the approaches that will have the greatest impact on Africa-whether trade, climate, or social policies-are not unique to Africa but will have a very different impact on the continent than they will in other parts of the world. The fact that U.S. relations with Africa continue to be largely determined by the unintended consequences of efforts prioritized elsewhere defines the challenges and pitfalls that policymakers face. There
fore, adopting approaches that are specifically tailored to Africa’s needs and sensitivities will be essential for any administration seeking to deepen partnerships.
The fact that much of the United States’ relationship with Africa continues to be determined by the unintended consequences of prioritized efforts elsewhere in the world defines the challenges and pitfalls that policymakers face.
Commerce
The next administration will first need to renew the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) , which was put in place under the Clinton administration and remains a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Africa, set to expire at the end of fiscal year 2025. The inherent strength of the law comes from the fact that it emerged as a direct response to African leaders’ long-standing demand for a relationship with Washington based on ‘ trade, not aid .’ But while it remains a defining program of the U.S. relationship with Africa, its promises remain unfulfilled and uneven. Only 32 of 54 African countries are currently
eligible for duty-free access to the U.S. market under AGOA, while more than 80 percent of AGOA’s benefits accrue to just five countries.
Expanding AGOA’s scope and impact should be at the heart of its renewal, but this will require breaking with the recent precedent in which the Biden administration has stripped more countries (seven) of AGOA eligibility than it has reinstated (two), the most suspensions ever by a president. There are concerns that a potential Harris administration will push for seemingly onerous environmental, social, and governance (ESG) requirements that could further hobble AGOA, which would be equally capable of punishing as it rewards African states that fail to meet Washington’s high standards and reinforcing the United States’ reputation as a fair-weather friend of Africa. Similarly, Republican threats to suspend participation by South Africa, AGOA’s largest beneficiary, because of Pretoria’s ‘ outrageous anti-Americanism ‘ also risk further stoking African accusations that the Unit
ed States is an unreliable partner. For this reason, either administration would do well to insulate this commercial privilege from the kinds of domestic political machinations that regularly undermine American interests abroad.
Ukraine
Africa has suffered undue consequences not only because of the war in Ukraine, but also because of Washington’s response to it. High inflation, as well as sanctions banning trade with Russia in key commodities like fertilizer and wheat, have hurt African economies. And the ‘us versus them’ narrative that Washington has created within the United Nations has alienated African partners and strengthened the ties of America’s adversaries on the continent. In particular, Russia has succeeded in convincing many Africans that it was American adventurism and aggressive action that had provoked Moscow’s invasion.
Thus, explicit efforts to end the war in Ukraine and restore price stability to the global economy will be greeted with resounding applause in Africa. Trump has repeatedly p
romised to end the war in Ukraine quickly, and his policy platform boldly asserts that ‘war breeds inflation, while geopolitical stability brings price stability. Republicans will end global chaos and restore peace through strength, reducing geopolitical risks and lowering commodity prices.’ Conversely, a Harris administration could redouble its efforts to bleed Russia in Ukraine without taking more explicit steps to protect Africa from the war’s unintended effects; this could spark greater resentment among African states and provide new opportunities for Russia to undermine U.S. interests on the continent.
Military cooperation
In 2017, Islamist militants ambushed four U.S. Army Green Berets in Tongo Tongo, Niger, highlighting the small but significant presence of American troops on the African continent. In response to the incident, President Trump asked ‘what interest do we have in putting American soldiers at risk in fights in Africa that are not ours?’ ordering a ‘ clean slate ‘ of U.S. forces in Africa
that could have resulted in a complete withdrawal of troops from the continent, which was almost entirely achieved in Somalia. However, Trump’s term ended before this assessment was completed, and it was quickly abandoned under a Biden administration eager to address growing terrorist threats through continued military partnerships.
Could a second Trump administration return to this ‘America First’ deployment strategy in Africa? In a piece in Foreign Affairs , Robert O’Brien, Trump’s former and perhaps future national security adviser, argued that ‘the Pentagon should consider deploying the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific, including relieving it of missions in the Middle East and North Africa.’ But Africa is very different today than it was when Trump was in office. The threat from violent extremist organizations has spread throughout the Sahel, and Russia is now a major player in the security landscape in a growing number of African states. After the expulsions from Chad and Niger over the summer, the U.
S. force presence is now even smaller than it was when Trump was president. In a less military-focused approach, the Biden administration is pursuing a more comprehensive policy response to these growing security threats, with Vice President Harris announcing a $100 million aid package for frontline states seeking to strengthen resilience and local community efforts to prevent extremist recruitment – an approach that the Harris presidency appears poised to continue.
But with some perspective, much of Africa remains largely skeptical of an increased U.S. military presence on the continent. With U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) already considering potential new bases for U.S. forces in Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Chad, and Libya, a Trump approach that actively seeks to limit U.S. military presence on the continent could be seen as a welcome change. However, frontline states in West Africa facing growing threats from jihadist groups in the Sahel may view this reduction in U.S. power projection as an attack on their own
security. It will be difficult for either administration to calibrate the right distribution of U.S. power. Critical to this endeavor will be letting African leaders and their publics take the lead in setting the terms of engagement, something the Defense Department has struggled to do in countries like Chad and Niger , which expelled U.S. forces in recent months.
It will be difficult for either administration to determine the appropriate allocation of American power. To do so, it will be essential to let African leaders and their publics take the lead in defining the terms of engagement.
Competition between great powers
One of Africa’s memories of Trump’s time in office is his vision of the continent as a chessboard to check China’s growing malign ambitions. The way in which US relations with Africa are framed by great-power competition recalls Cold War-era policies that created zones of influence in Africa and proxy conflicts that undermined the continent’s political and economic development for decades.
While the Biden administration has been careful to present US engagements in Africa as strategically important for a host of other reasons , its choice of partners suggests that China remains a key driver of US engagement in Africa.
The favor that Washington has bestowed on Angola over the past two administrations, a state with a spotty human rights and governance record and an even worse corruption record, is a perfect example. The Biden administration has rapidly accelerated its charm offensive with Angola, as evidenced by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s repeated visits to Luanda, hosting Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço in the Oval Office, and Biden himself preparing to visit Angola in October, his only trip to Africa as president. This reflects an unprecedented campaign to pull Angola out of the communist orbit in which it has lived for decades.
The United States has also paid particular attention to Equatorial Guinea , a country with an even more d
ismal human rights record but abundant natural gas reserves. It has shown openness to hosting a Chinese naval base. Multiple senior U.S. officials have visited President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Africa’s longest-serving leader at 42, and his heir apparent, proving that it is possible to keep China at bay-especially when Washington is willing to suspend its values-based approach.
Africans are aware of this double standard and, in many cases, are doing everything they can to stoke competition between the United States and China to their own advantage. Both Harris and Trump appear willing to continue playing this game, which in the long run will only further undermine Washington’s already battered credibility in Africa-unless efforts to keep China at bay are not explicitly framed as an attempt to contain or undermine China, but as motivated by a deeper desire to improve U.S. bilateral relations with African countries.
Climate
Africa is suffering from the global climate crisis in multiple ways, despite b
eing the continent least responsible for it. For years, African leaders have decried Western-imposed climate policies that limit the types of energy Africa can access, the mechanisms it can use to finance new energy projects, and the additional environmental conditions imposed on their development. In a 2022 Economist commentary , Nigeria’s vice president said : ‘Rich countries, particularly in Europe, have repeatedly called on African states to use only renewable energy sources. . . . The ‘all-renewables’ mantra is also driven by unwarranted fears about the continent’s future emissions. Yet under any plausible scenario, Africa poses no threat to global climate goals.’
The Biden administration, for its part, has acknowledged some of these problems but has not used its influence in institutions like the World Bank to lift the ban on financing fossil fuels, especially natural gas projects, as Africans have been demanding. Interestingly, this policy could perhaps be better aligned with the political goals of Af
rican states. As a recent Heritage Foundation paper points out , ‘It is obscene for aid agencies to demand that Africans forgo economic growth to satisfy Western fears of climate catastrophe. A conservative foreign aid policy should prioritize real people over climate paranoia.’ But while much more needs to be done to address their energy needs, Africans want more than just an acknowledgement of the problem; they want to see tangible progress. A US administration willing to challenge the current climate finance orthodoxy will find deals to strike in Africa that generate positive externalities beyond the energy sector.
Immigration
No domestic U.S. policy issue is likely to be more acute in Africa than immigration. Africans clearly remember the painful language President Trump used when he enacted his first ‘ Muslim ban ‘ in his first hours in office. A new, and possibly expanded, ban on entry to the United States by citizens of a host of Muslim-majority African countries could well damage relations with the
continent before any new Africa policy can be formulated.
Countries like Sudan, Libya, and Somalia, whose citizens were previously banned from entering the United States, could join an even longer list under a second Trump administration due to the increase in illegal migration of West Africans across the U.S. southern border in recent years. The fact that many of these African migrants hail from countries now considered by AFRICOM to represent a new epicenter of global jihadist violence increases the chances that a Trump administration could bar more Africans from entering the United States. While promises of immigration bans, strict enforcement, and ‘mass deportations,’ as outlined in the Republican platform , appeal to a certain American constituency, such sweeping policies have the potential to undermine every aspect of U.S. engagement in Africa.
Social issues
One element that continues to irk U.S. partners in Africa is Washington’s tendency to impose its own social values ??on global development polic
y. Whether it is the requirement that countries respect and expand LGBTQ rights , as set out in the Biden administration’s policy, which will likely be maintained under a Harris administration, or the bans on funding for family planning and abortion supported by successive Republican administrations, both parties have a history of imposing their respective mores on their African partners.
Uganda was suspended from the AGOA program last year and its officials were subjected to numerous visa restrictions and financial penalties for passing a bill criminalizing same-sex relations. At the same time, $1 billion from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) – a popular bipartisan program aimed at combating HIV/AIDS in Africa – was blocked because of Republican allegations that the program also funds abortions abroad.
As a recent Heritage Foundation study of U.S. development assistance points out: ‘Washington should devote its limited [development] resources to programs that all Americans can suppor
t, not to partisan projects. Pursuing the latter would only further divide a polarized country and lead to poor outcomes around the world. African countries, for example, resent having aid tied to what they see as ideological colonialism and regularly point out that China attaches no strings to its aid.’
While acknowledging that this rethinking of US development policy may be half the battle, a Trump or Harris administration is unlikely to abandon its ‘pet partisan projects,’ even if it means ceding more ground to the US’s global competitors. This approach risks complicating relations with Africa for years to come.
Conclusion
A new U.S. administration will take office in January and will immediately face a host of security and political challenges facing African states, from the civil war in Sudan to the spread of extremism in the Sahel to instability in the Great Lakes region. Addressing these challenges will require local partners and local knowledge to craft a response tailored to the specific circumsta
nces of each problem. However, much of the overall U.S. policy agenda toward Africa-from trade to finance to development to climate-is defined elsewhere and applied unevenly across the continent, in ways that fail to fully meet the needs of Africans or have the impact the United States desires.
As global competition for influence intensifies on this increasingly strategic continent, African leaders will seek to ensure that their interests are heard and addressed. This will require the United States to tailor its responses to their specific concerns, but also to refrain from imposing its own internal political struggles on its partners. African leaders and Washington have both benefited from the bipartisan political consensus that has defined their relationship for decades. But if that bipartisanship erodes further, the United States risks ceding even more influence to its competitors and further alienating a continent that already views it as unreliable. Washington’s ability to arrest and reverse this trend
will largely determine the strength of relations with the continent well beyond the new administration.
*Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.
Source: Africa News Agency
